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AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF DOUBLE EFFECT
THOMAS A. CAVANAUGH
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO

In this paper, I present Aquinas's account of double-effect reasoning (DER) -often called the "principle," "rule," or "doctrine" of double effect. Often, if not
always, DER is attributed to Thomas Aquinas tout court.i Yet, I will argue,
Thomas's account substantially differs from contemporary double-effect reasoning
(DER) insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of risking an assailant's life
while contemporary accounts of DER focus on actions causing harm foreseen as
inevitable.ii
Of course, if DER applies to cases in which harm is foreseen as an
inevitable result of an otherwise good action, it will apply to cases in which harm
is foreseen as being a possible consequence. The reverse, however, need not
obtain. For example, one might think that it is ethical for an ironworker
knowingly to risk his life doing dangerous work while one would not think it
ethical for the ironworker knowingly to do work from which his death would
follow inevitably. Thus, one might think that it is ethical to risk causing harm
which one would not think it ethical to cause inevitably. I will argue that Aquinas
holds something like this point in his account of DER.
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Q.64, a.7 and "Praeter Intentionem"
The locus classicus of double-effect reasoning is Aquinas' discussion of
homicidal self-defense found in S.t. IIaIIae, q.64, a.7.iii Q. 64 occurs within
Aquinas's consideration of vices opposed to commutative justice. Q. 64 concerns
what Aquinas considers the greatest injury committed upon one's neighbor against
his will: his death.
In article seven, Thomas asks whether it is licit to kill a man in
self-defense. He offers a number of objections against the liceity of so acting. St.
Augustine voices two objections. The first comes from his epistle to Publicola; the
second Thomas takes from Augustine's De Libero arbitrio. There Augustine asks:
How are they free from sin in the sight of divine providence
who, for the sake of these contemnible things have taken a
human life? (q.64, a.7, ob.2)
Aquinas notes that among the slight goods which men may forfeit against their
wills, Augustine includes corporeal life. Augustine appears to rule out homicidal
self-defense.
Aquinas interprets Augustine as not permitting the intentional taking of
an aggressor's life. Thomas has noted earlier in his discussion of war (q. 40, a.1)
that Augustine thinks it licit for one charged with the public good to take life
during a war. Accordingly, in q. 64, a.7, Aquinas considers the bailiff and the
soldier to be agents who may in self-defense and as public officials intentionally
take the life of an aggressor. Thus, in q. 64, a.7, the self-defense of particular
interest is that of the private individual, as such, taking the life of an assailant.
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The corpus of q.64, a.7 reads:
Nothing prevents one act from having two effects, of which
only one is intended, the other being praeter intentionem.
Now moral acts receive their character (speciem) according
to that which is intended, not, however, from that which is
praeter intentionem, since this is accidental, as is evident
from what has been said earlier.iv Thus, from the act of
self-defense, two effects may follow: one, the conservation
of one's own life; the other, the death of the aggressor
(occisio invadentis). Since what is intended is the
conservation of one's own life, such an act is not illicit: it is
natural for each thing to preserve itself in existence for as
long as it is able. Nevertheless, some act proceeding from a
good intention may be rendered illicit if it is not
proportioned to the end (proportionatus fini). Thus, it
would not be licit if someone defending his own life were
to use more force than necessary. But, if he repels force
with moderation, his defensive act will be licit: for,
according to the jurists, it is licit to repel force by force,
with the moderation of a blameless defense (cum
moderamine inculpatae tutelae.) Nor is it necessary for
salvation that a man forego an act of moderate force in
order to avoid the death of another: since one is more
responsible (plus tenetur) to care for (providere) one's
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own life than someone else's. But, since to kill a man is not
licit except for the public authority acting for the sake of
the common good (as is evident from what was previously
said [article 3]), it is not licit for a man to intend to kill
another man in order to defend himself, except for those
who have public authority. These, intending to kill a man in
self-defense, refer this to the public good. This is evident in
the case of a soldier fighting an enemy, and in the case of a
minister of the judge fighting (pugnante) against thieves.
Nevertheless, even these would sin if they were moved by
private animosity.
What does Thomas mean by the phrase "praeter intentionem?" I will argue that
in q.64, a.7, Aquinas uses "praeter intentionem" to refer to a characteristic, but
not exclusive result which is not accidental, nor intentional, nor inevitable. I will
argue that Aquinas understands justified private homicidal self-defense to be an
action in which the defendant risked killing the assailant.
To do something which one foresees as inevitably resulting in the death of
the assailant is not to risk the assailant's life knowingly. To risk the aggressor's life
knowingly is not to do something which one foresees as inevitably resulting in the
assailant's death. Yet, contemporary accounts of DER paradigmatically apply to
knowingly causing inevitable harm. In this respect, Thomas's account
substantially differs from the accounts offered by contemporary theorists of DER.

Praeter Intentionem: Intended or Accidental?

4

To what does "praeter intentionem" refer? In this section I argue against
three interpretations of this phrase. I will argue first, that "praeter intentionem"
clearly does not refer to what one intends; second, that it does not refer to
something intended in some special sense; and, third, that it does not refer to an
accidental consequence of one's action.
With respect to what "praeter intentionem" in q.64, a.7 means, Aquinas
refers his reader to an earlier article. There he maintains that:
[A]ctive scandal is accidental when it is outside the
intention (praeter intentionem) of the agent: as when a
man by his inordinate deed or word does not intend to give
another an occasion of downfall, but only to satisfy his
will.v
Clearly, Aquinas does not use "praeter intentionem" to refer to what one does
intend.
Yet, as Steven Windass notes, by "praeter intentionem" Aquinas has
been taken to mean that:
[Y]ou can in case of necessity kill in self-defence, provided
that in a special theological sense you do not intend to do
so.vi
Some interpreters of Aquinas do attribute to him an idiosyncratic method of
intention. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. notes:
Aquinas is one of the chief architects of the tradition in
which the doctrine of direction of intention was
developed.vii
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We encounter an account of the direction of one's intention in Pascal's famous
parody of Jesuit casuistry found in the seventh of Les lettres Provinciales. There
Pascal presents his famous Jesuit's infamous grande methode de diriger
l'intention.viii According to Pascal's Jesuit, by following this method one can
stroll about the dueling green, not intending to fight one's opponent, but intending
to walk about. Of course, if one's opponent attacked, one could defend oneself.
This, following the logic of the method of directing one's intention, would not be
dueling.ix Aquinas himself, however, nowhere articulates such a doctrine.
Boyle claims that such a doctrine grounds DER. He says:
The doctrine of the double effect presupposes at least this:
that one can direct his intention to the good effect of his
action and withhold it from the bad effect if the latter is not
a means to the former.x
Such a direction of intention or withholding of intention would itself be
intentional. Insofar as DER theorists think that intentions are ethically relevant,
they will presumably think that intentions with respect to one's intentions,
second-order intentions, are also ethically relevant. Of course, directing one's
intention would be a second-order intention.xi
DER does not repose -- indeed, may not be able to repose -- on the
direction, withholding, or paring of one's intentions. It does, however, rest on
one's being able to foresee harm without intending harm. It is at best an infelicity
to speak of not intending some foreseen harm as directing one's intention away
from the foreseen harm. If there were such a method of intention, it would found a
"morality of gestures and poses."xii In any case, Aquinas does not propose such a
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morality, nor does he use "praeter intentionem" to refer to some special way of
intending.
Aquinas says that what is praeter intentionem is per accidens. He has
been interpreted as meaning that it is accidental in the sense of being an accidental
consequence. For example, referring to q.64, a.7, Anthony Kenny claims:
In the context it is not clear whether Aquinas is justifying
accidental killing in the course of a struggle or intentional
killing when this is the only way to avoid being killed.xiii
Yet, Aquinas explicitly denies the justifiability of a private individual's intentional
killing of an aggressor (q. 64, a.7 corpus and ad 2). Does Aquinas mean to speak,
as Kenny suggests, of an accidental killing in the course of a struggle?
What would it mean to say that one accidentally killed another in the
course of a struggle? It would mean that one were engaged in pushing and shoving
and pulling another and that the aggressor's death came about, say, by his tripping,
falling, and breaking his neck. Such a death would result accidentally, just as
someone could die while engaged in friendly horseplay.

If this is what

Aquinas means when he claims that what is praeter intentionem is accidental,
then he has brought out an unwieldy concept to attend to what almost every
action-theorist acknowledges: an agent is not responsible for consequences which
accidentally result from his actions. Moreover, in the article immediately
subsequent to that on self-defense, Aquinas asks whether an agent who has killed
a man by chance (casualiter occidens hominem, a. 8) is guilty of homicide. He
answers in the negative. This discussion already would have been addressed if
what is praeter intentionem were per accidens in the sense of an accidental
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consequence. So, besides the generally acknowledged point that agents are not
responsible for the accidental consequences of their actions, q.64, a.8 would lead
one to think that Thomas does not use "praeter intentionem" to refer to an
accidental consequence.
Yet, Kenny is not alone in his interpretation. Steven Windass, in a separate
investigation, understands Thomas to consider the attacker's death an accidental
consequence. Offering what he takes to be Aquinas's position, Windass says:
[I]t is lawful to repel force by force; if this results in the death of the
attacker, the death will be accidental.xiv
As noted, there are good reasons internal to his discussion to think that Aquinas
does not mean that the death of the assailant will be accidental. Windass notes
that:
[I]t would be very odd [of Aquinas] to discuss the
permissibility of different kinds of accident.xv
I agree. It would be very odd of Thomas to use such a distinction to discuss kinds
of accidental consequences. I take this to be a reason to think that Aquinas does
not so use "praeter intentionem."
I have argued that Aquinas does not use "praeter intentionem" to refer -as some have thought -- to what one intends, or to what one directs one's intention
away from, or to an accidental consequence. In order to understand what he means
when he says in q. 64, a.7 that what is "praeter intentionem is per accidens," I
will now briefly investigate Thomas's account of intention and the elements he
proposes for the ethical assessment of acts.
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Intention and the Ethical Analysis of an Act
In IaIIae, q.12, Aquinas considers intention. In q.12, a.1, Aquinas claims,
"intention, just as the very word implies, means to tend to something [in aliquid
tendere]". Since the will (voluntas) moves the powers of the soul to their
appropriate ends, it is evident, Thomas asserts, that intention is an act of the will.
He argues that intention is the act of the will with respect to the end "as the term
towards which something is ordained" (IaIIae, q.12, a.1, ad 4).
According to Thomas, we will the end, we choose the means, and we
intend the complex, end-through-means. Using Aquinas's example, when we
intend health, we intend health-by-means-of-medicine. We choose
medicine-for-the-sake-of-health. How does Aquinas understand the agent's
intention to relate to the goodness of the agent's act?
Thomas offers an elaborate account of the goodness and badness of human
actions in IaIIae, qs. 18, 19, 20, and 21. For the sake of understanding his
statement in q.64, a.7, it is not necessary to articulate his entire analysis.
Nevertheless, what he has to say about the relation of the intention of the end to
the moral analysis of the goodness or badness of an act requires attention.
Aquinas proposes a complex analysis of actions. Each aspect relates
variously to the others. This reflects the Dionysian dictum that goodness is
integral; evil, the lack of such integrity, vitiates what otherwise is morally good
(IaIIae, q.19, a.6, ad 1).xvi For the moral assessment of an act, three aspects of the
act require attention, as Aquinas argues: what is being done (the deed or object),
the circumstances in which it is done, and the end or reason it is done (IaIIae,
q.18, a.1.)
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According to Thomas, of the aspects of an action which make up its
integral goodness or its disintegrated badness, the intention of the end is a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a complete analysis of the action's
ethical status.
In the light of his account of the relation between intention and the ethical
analysis of action, it becomes clear what Aquinas means in q.64, a.7 when he
asserts that, "moral acts receive their character according to what is intended, not
according to what is praeter intentionem, for this is per accidens". Clearly,
Thomas asserts that what is praeter intentionem is not essential to establishing
the agent's action as good or as bad.
If the assailant's death results from a private individual's justified act of
self-defense and the death is neither intended nor accidental, how is the death
further, and positively, characterized? In q.64, a.7, Aquinas proposes and contrasts
two cases of homicidal self-defense, that of a public official and that of a private
individual. I will contrast these two cases in order to characterize, in a positive
manner, the death of an assailant in the case of a private individual's justified
homicidal self-defense.

Two Cases Contrasted
Aquinas holds that an officer of the polity -- a police officer in
contemporary terms -- can intend to take the life of his aggressor as long as he
uses minimal force (proportionatus fini), refers the slaying to the common good,
and does not harbor animosity against the attacker (q.64, a.7.) In the case of a
private individual's justified homicidal self-defense, Thomas accepts the slaying
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of the assailant as long as it results from the use of minimal force and is not
intentional. In both cases there is the common requirement that the force used is
proportionatus fini. I take this to mean that the force used is minimal; that is, not
more than is necessary for the preservation of one's life.
Say that I am a private individual. Both I and my assailant have swords.
We begin to fight with them. I realize that my aggressor has far greater endurance
than I and that the only way I can preserve my life is to kill him, say by cutting off
his head. According to Thomas, I cannot do so because I cannot intentionally kill
him. Thus, if this case were to obtain, then, according to Thomas, I, as a private
individual, would not be permitted so to defend myself. If I were an officer of the
state, however, executing my role as such, and I were in this same situation,
Aquinas holds it permissible for me intentionally to take the life of the aggressor
by cutting of his head.
Thus, while in both cases the force used must be proportionatus fini, this
corresponds to a larger set of possible responses in the case of the officer of the
state. For, according to Thomas, the officer of the state may proximately intend to
take his assailant's life. Therefore, he may use a neck-severing sword stroke, for it
is proportioned to this end.
In the case of a private individual, however, minimal force does not
include cases in which such force corresponds to an intention to take the life of
the attacker. For, according to Thomas, the private individual cannot
intentionally take the assailant's life. Thus, the private individual cannot use
means proportioned to the taking of the aggressor's life. A neck-severing sword
stroke is such a means. Such a sword stroke is proportioned to the preservation of
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one's own life only insofar as it is proportioned to the taking of the aggressor's
life. Therefore, according to Thomas, a private individual cannot use such a sword
stroke.
Thus, when Windass asserts that asking for double effect's reading of an
ethical act of self-defense, "you can be fairly sure that ... your original impression
of what you could actually do would not be changed,"xvii he is right about the
pilloried Jesuit of Pascal's seventh provincial letter, but not about Thomas.
I have assumed that Aquinas would permit the use of a weapon, and even a
potentially deadly one, a sword. A weapon is an instrument. As an instrument it
admits of characteristic ends. One defending his own life with a sword may not
maintain that the assailant's death results accidentally from the employment of a
sword. One of the ends to which sword-makers fashion swords is the taking of
human life. Presumably, a sword not fit for the taking of another's life is not much
of a sword.
The use of a sword contrasts with pushing an attacker, who then stumbles
on the curb, falls, and dies of a broken neck. Characteristically, pushing, shoving,
pulling, scratching, biting, kicking, gouging, and generally being a great nuisance
to an aggressor does not result in his death. If death were to result from such acts,
it would result accidentally. Because death does not characteristically result from
the ingenious deployment of teeth, nails, knees, elbows, and fists, one's attacker
could not charge one with endangering his life by so defending oneself.
If one were to use a sword, however, the attacker could claim that his life
had been endangered. This is significant for two reasons. First, although the one
defending himself by means of a sword may not intend to take the life of the
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aggressor, he is willing to risk taking the aggressor's life. Second, if intending to
take another's life differs from knowingly endangering another's life, then there is
something else besides either the assailant's death resulting intentionally or the
death resulting accidentally; namely, there is the assailant's death resulting as a
risked consequence. I will now develop this point.

Risking Homicide
Accidental homicide differs from homicide which results from having
endangered life. In an accidental killing, the agent inculpably does not foresee the
death. When death results from having knowingly endangered someone's life,
however, the agent foresaw the death as a possible consequence of his action.
Accordingly, when one kills someone accidentally, one is not ethically
responsible for his death; when one kills someone whose life one has knowingly
endangered, one is ethically responsible for his death. Thus, killing someone
accidentally importantly differs from killing someone whose life one has
knowingly endangered.
Does intentionally killing someone differ from killing someone as the
result of risking his life? When one intends to take another's life, one certainly
endangers his life. Indeed, being the object of someone's intention to kill is
probably the most extreme case of having one's life endangered. Does one intend
to take another's life if one endangers another's life? For example, does one intend
to take one's own life when one endangers one's own life?
Soldiers, stuntmen, race-car drivers, police officers, firefighters, and
construction workers knowingly endanger their lives. Do they intend their own
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deaths? Perhaps some of them do and perhaps some of them ought not so to
endanger their lives even if they do not intend to take them. In any case, it would
indeed be an eccentric theory of intention which concluded that anyone who
knowingly imperilled his life intended his death. Similarly, there is no reason to
say that knowingly jeopardizing another's life is to intend the other's death.
Chancing the assailant's life is precisely what I do if I do not intend to take
his life, but I knowingly risk it in defense of my own life. I choose to risk his life
rather than to forfeit my own, and such a choice on my part is ethically assessable.
That the assailant's death characteristically might follow from my using a sword in
defense of my life indicates that I am more willing to preserve my life than I am to
forego hazarding the assailant's.
As I understand Aquinas, he proposes that a private individual may not
intend to take the life of an assailant, while he may knowingly risk the assailant's
life by defending himself with such force that the aggressor's death, if it results,
would be one of the foreseeable characteristic consequences of the self-defensive
act.
This interpretation may strike some as novel. Nevertheless, it accords with
what Aquinas himself implies when he asserts that:
[T]he act of fornication or of adultery is not ordered to the
conservation of one's own life out of necessity as is the act
from which sometimes (quandoque) follows homicide
(q.64, a.7, ad 4).
Aquinas restricts "praeter intentionem," as he uses it in his consideration of
self-defense, to what occurs sometimes, but not always. Thus, in q.64, a.7
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Aquinas does not appear to consider the foresight of an inevitable consequence,
for such a consequence would not be said to follow "sometimes."
Joseph Boyle, Jr., however, offers an interpretation of q.64. a.7, which
substantially differs from my account. He notes that:
The use of `quandoque' to describe the frequency of the
deadly consequence following from an act of self-defense
suggests that the assailant's death is not a natural and totally
predictable consequence of the act as such.xviii
Boyle, nonetheless, denies that "quandoque" has this meaning in q.64, a.7. He
asserts that the assailant's death is foreseen as a totally predictable and inevitable
consequence of the act of moderate self-defense proposed by Aquinas.
Having noted that with "quandoque" Thomas seems to exclude some acts
of self-defense, Boyle observes:
[T]here appear to be types of self-defense in which the use
of the minimum force needed to preserve one's life does
have the assailant's death as a natural and certainly
foreseeable consequence.xix
I agree. There are such instances, such as the neck-severing sword stroke I
mentioned earlier. As I have argued, Aquinas rules out precisely such a case.
Boyle, however, thinks that Aquinas considers such an act to be ethically in the
clear.
Boyle notes that Thomas uses "praeter intentionem" one hundred and
forty-three times in his massive œevre.xx Boyle concedes that Thomas usually
uses this term to refer to consequences which follow sometimes, or rarely. As
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Boyle notes, Aquinas infrequently uses "praeter intentionem" to refer to
consequences which follow always or for the most part.xxi I do not dispute this
point. I do maintain, however, that Thomas does not use "praeter intentionem"
in q.64, a.7 to refer to an assailant's death foreseen as inevitable. That is, q.64, a.7
is not one of the rare cases in which Thomas uses "praeter intentionem" to refer
to what happens always or for the most part.
Boyle's interpretation is problematic insofar as he discounts "quandoque"
in ad 4 while noting that the minority of uses of "praeter intentionem" apply to
cases in which a result follows always or for the most part. Thomas's use of
"quandoque" in response to the fourth objection and his preponderant use of
"praeter intentionem" to apply to what occurs infrequently, militate against
Boyle's interpretation of "praeter intentionem" in q.64, a.7. Moreover, Boyle
does not explain what Aquinas means by "quandoque" in ad 4 if he does not
mean to restrict "praeter intentionem" to consequences which do not result for
the most part. The onus of proving that "praeter intentionem" in q.64, a.7 refers
to a consequence foreseen as inevitable falls upon Boyle.
In objection to my interpretation, one might argue that "quandoque"
refers not to homicidal self-defense, but to self-defense in general. Thus, Thomas
would be noting that self-defense is justified, even though the death of the
aggressor sometimes follows from acts of self-defense. This, however, is a
non-starter, for the question is whether homicidal self-defense is justified, not
whether self-defense simpliciter is justified. Although it sounds awkward, one
could say that Aquinas argues that when the conditions of DER have been met, a
private individual's act of homicidal self-defense that is sometimes homicidal is
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justified.
I have argued that in q.64, a.7, Aquinas uses "praeter intentionem" to
refer to a risked consequence. In his discussion of homicidal self-defense, he does
not extend this concept to inevitable results. In fact, in his response to the fourth
objection, he limits his use of the distinction to cases in which the result follows
sometimes, and thereby excludes from his justification cases in which the harm
follows always.
In the standard contemporary cases of DER, such as strategic bombing
which harms noncombatants and palliative morphine administration to a
terminally ill patient which hastens or causes death, the harm is foreseen as an
inevitable consequence of the action. In his account of a private individual's
justified homicidal self-defense, Thomas holds that the defender knowingly
risked the assailant's life. This excludes the use of means which one foresees as
inevitably resulting in death, for one could not be said knowingly to risk killing
the aggressor if one foresaw that one would inevitably kill the aggressor. Thus,
Aquinas's originating account of DER substantially differs from what DER has
become insofar as Thomas restricts his account to cases in which one can be said
to risk foreseen harm.

The Second Condition of DER
Aquinas's account of DER is not simply that it is ethically in the clear to
risk causing the death of one's assailant insofar as one does not intend to kill one's
assailant.xxii This is only the first condition of his account: the foreseen risked
consequence is not intended. Like contemporary accounts of DER, Aquinas
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argues that in addition to this first condition, a second condition must be met for
the risking of the harm to be justified. He argues that:
It is not necessary for salvation for a man to forego
(praetermittat) an act of moderate defense in order to
avoid (evitandum) the death of another, since a man is
more responsible to provide (plus tenetur .. providere) for
his own life than for that of another (q.64, a.7).
Thomas asserts that one has a greater obligation to watch over one's own life than
to do so over another's. Thus, when it comes to preserving lives, ceteris paribus,
one is more obliged to preserve one's own than another's. Of course, covered by
the "other things being equal" clause are such factors as the role one has with
respect to the other's life at risk. For example, a captain of a sinking ship may be
more obliged to care for a passenger's life than for his own.
When one's own life has been put at risk by an assailant, since one is,
ceteris paribus, more bound to care for one's own life than for another's, one need
not forego risking the attacker's life. One who would not defend his own life when
this entails endangering the life of the attacker might exercise too little
responsibility with respect to the good of life in his care. So, not only may
self-defense be permissible, it may be required when not to defend one's own life
is to act with too little care for what has been entrusted to one.

Summary
Aquinas offers the following analysis of an act that is ethically in the clear,
but for its risking foreseen harm. First, the harm cannot be intended. Second, the
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act fulfills some responsibility the agent has which is greater than the
responsibility the agent has to avoid the harm.
In his account of a private individual's justified homicidal self-defense,
Thomas presents the seeds of DER as it is presently understood. Yet, in one
important feature, his contribution differs from contemporary double-effect
reasoning. That feature became evident in Thomas's use of "quandoque" to
characterize the assailant's death as risked.
It requires a considerable, and, as I have argued, ultimately untenable
interpretive stretch to attribute to Thomas the application of "praeter
intentionem" in his treatment of a private individual's act of homicidal
self-defense to cases in which the assailant's death is foreseen as resulting
inevitably. Accordingly, one cannot attribute contemporary double-effect
reasoning to Thomas tout court.
The point of this paper has been to argue that Thomas does not use DER to
justify a private individual's homicidal self defense in cases in which the
aggressor's death is foreseen as inevitable. He does use it in cases in which the
assailant's life was risked. What is the value of noting this difference between
Aquinas's account and contemporary accounts of DER?
If one does not note this difference, then one will attribute to Aquinas an
idiosyncratic account of intention which he does not have. For example, Jeff
McMahan, following the customary interpretation, says:
Aquinas ... assumes that it is possible for one to foresee
with certainty that one's act will kill one's assailant without
intending the killing as a means of self-defence. ... To
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illustrate [this] view, consider:
Self Defence 1: One's only defence against an unjust and
potentially lethal attack is to shoot the attacker at close
range with a flame-thrower.xxiii
McMahan thinks that Aquinas and "the followers of Aquinas" hold that this case
is an instance of self-defense justified by DER.xxiv If one thinks that a defender
can shoot one's attacker at close range with a flame-thrower, and that this is not
intentional, then one seems to rely on a very narrow conception of what it is to
intend a means. But, if one relies on such an account, then how will one argue, for
example, that a terror bomber cannot drop bombs on noncombatants without
intending their deaths? If one can use DER in the case of self-defense presented
by McMahan, then one seems able to use it in terror bombing as well. As
McMahan notes, such an account of DER, "results in an unacceptably permissive
doctrine."xxv
I trust that readers will realize that Thomas's account of DER is one which
concerns the risking of harm. Accordingly, Thomas does not rely on an
idiosyncratic account of intention which turns DER into the laxist account
parodied by Pascal and rightly rejected by McMahan.
What does Thomas's account imply about the contemporary application of
DER to cases, such as death-hastening palliative morphine administration to a
terminally ill patient and strategic bombing which harms non-combatants, in
which agents foresee the harm as resulting inevitably? Are there ethically relevant
differences between self-defense and other cases of DER?xxvi These questions
deserve consideration; nonetheless, they belong to a paper other than the present
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one.
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